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INTRODUCTION 
Forum shopping—the exercise of strategic choice between 
multiple jurisdictions in the pursuit of legal action—endures as a 
vexing institutional feature of the American court system, as well as a 
conceptual and normative challenge to judges and commentators 
alike.  While courts and scholars have been lamenting for generations 
the inefficiencies and inequities of forum shopping,1 the problem 
remains as germane as ever.  Shady Grove v. Allstate,2 in which the 
Supreme Court recently applied the Erie doctrine3 to the effect of 
allowing, in federal court, diversity-based class actions that cannot 
proceed in New York state courts, invoked concerns of vertical forum 
shopping between state and federal forums.  A plurality of the Court’s 
justices acknowledged that forum shopping would be an objectionable 
but inevitable result of the Court’s decision;4 and initial empirical 
 
 1  See, e.g., Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Texas, 134 S. Ct. 568, 583 (2013) (stating that interpretation of venue and 
transfer statutes should not “encourage gamesmanship” or “create or multiply 
opportunities for forum shopping”) (quoting in part Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 
U.S. 516, 523 (1990)); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 447 (2004) (stressing the 
need to curb “rampant forum shopping” in habeas petitions and the “inconvenience, 
expense, and embarrassment” it begets); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) 
(noting the aim of “discouragement of forum-shopping” in choice of law doctrine); 
Robinson v. McNeil Consumer Healthcare, 615 F.3d 861, 866 (7th Cir. 2010) (an 
incentive to forum shop in personal injury suits should be avoided); LYNN M. LOPUCKI, 
COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY 
COURTS 137–81 (2005) (arguing that bankruptcy venue rules lead to a corruptive 
competition between forums); Megan Woodhouse, Shop ‘til You Drop: Implementing 
Federal Rules of Patent Litigation Procedure To Wear Out Forum Shopping Patent Plaintiffs, 99 
GEO. L.J. 227 (2010) (describing convenience and fairness costs brought about by 
excessive forum shopping in patent litigation); Michelle J. White, Asbestos Litigation: 
Procedural Innovations and Forum Shopping, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 365, 396–97 (2006) 
(showing how forum shopping in asbestos litigation enables plaintiffs to push up 
damages and settlement awards, and suggesting this likely leads to over-deterrence); 
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping, 80 
CORNELL L. REV. 1507 (1995) (finding empirically that plaintiffs do forum shop and 
reap substantial benefits as a result); see also infra Parts I.B & C. 
 2  Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010). 
 3  Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 4  In Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 415–16, the court wrote: 
We must acknowledge the reality that keeping the federal-court door 
open to class actions that cannot proceed in state court will produce 
forum shopping.  That is unacceptable when it comes as the 
consequence of judge-made rules . . . . But divergence from state law, 
with the attendant consequence of forum shopping, is the inevitable 
(indeed, one might say the intended) result of a uniform system of 
federal procedure. 
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evidence seems to corroborate this prediction.5  Concerns over 
horizontal forum shopping (between the courts of different states or 
federal districts) also remain a recurring challenge for the legal system, 
with the most recent example being Walden v. Fiore, in which the 
Supreme Court denied the attempt of two plaintiffs from Nevada to 
file suit in their home state against a Georgia-based federal agent.6 
This Article suggests a novel solution to the problem of forum 
shopping, which many have come to see as an inescapable 
characteristic of the American court system with its considerable share 
of overlapping jurisdictions.7  Rather than proposing rules or doctrines 
that would mitigate the social costs of forum shopping or that seek to 
align strategic litigation practices with public interests, the Article 
explores the possibility of altering the very institutional foundations of 
forum selection.  It suggests replacing the initiator’s choice model, 
which normally lets the party instigating the litigation to choose —
shop—the forum of her preference,8 with a system of random case 
allocation among forums with overlapping jurisdictions. 
 
 
 
 5  See William H.J. Hubbard, An Empirical Study of the Effect of Shady Grove v. Allstate 
on Forum Shopping in the New York Courts, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 151 (2013) (reporting 
empirical results showing rise in federal court filings and decline in removals of 
putative class actions seeking statutory damages under New York law). 
 6  Walden concerned the fate of a Bivens action filed in Nevada federal court by 
two professional gamblers whose gambling proceeds were allegedly unlawfully seized 
by a DEA agent during a flight stopover in Atlanta.  Reversing the Las Vegas district 
court’s dismissal of the suit, the Ninth Circuit found Nevada had personal jurisdiction 
over the case.  The Ninth Circuit held that the Atlanta-located actions of the Atlanta-
based agent providing for the seizure and supporting a subsequent forfeiture of the 
Nevada-heading plaintiffs’ cash money had qualified as the minimum contacts 
necessary to establish jurisdiction (and venue) in Nevada.  Fiore v. Walden, 688 F.3d 
558 (9th Cir. 2012).  The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that the 
defendant had no contacts with Nevada; “the mere fact” that his Georgia-based actions 
“affected plaintiffs with connections to the forum State [did] not suffice to authorize 
jurisdiction.”  Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1126 (2014). 
 7  See, e.g., Robert Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and 
Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639, 641–42 (1981) (considering competing 
narratives as to the structure of the American Jurisdictional system as either “the 
persistence of . . . a dysfunctional relic” or “a product of institutional evolution”). 
 8  Removal from state to federal court is formally an exception to the initiator’s 
choice model since it grants the defendant, rather than the plaintiff, the right to 
determine the ultimate forum of litigation in applicable cases.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1441.  
Substantively, however, most of the familiar critiques of forum shopping hold in the 
removal context, but with respect to the uneven power of defendants.  See, e.g., Neal 
Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases under Diversity and Federal 
Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369 (1992).  For purposes of this Article, removal 
is hereon included in the “initiator’s choice” category. 
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Instead of forum shopping, the Article proposes a shift to a 
Random Allocation Model, which requires holding an ad hoc lottery 
at the point of filing that would determine which court of the available 
jurisdictions will hear the case.  In the Shady Grove context this would 
mean, for example, that rather than incentivizing class-action diversity 
plaintiffs seeking statutory damages under New York law to file in 
federal court, all such suits would be randomly allocated to either a 
state or federal forum,9 with obviously varying outcomes due to the 
divergence in applicable class action laws.  Similarly, in cases of 
ostensible horizontal overlap like Walden, a lottery would determine 
which state (or federal district) gets to apply its personal jurisdiction 
to the case;10 here, too, the costs of litigating away from home, as well 
as localist divergences, might affect case outcomes. 
The Random Allocation Model may seem at first blush as an 
affront to deeply ingrained principles of fairness and equality; it 
appears to elevate luck over reason as a determinant of the nature of 
litigation and sometimes of case outcomes as well.  The Article seeks, 
however, to show that while randomizing choice of forum might have 
some drawbacks, under specified conditions it is a superior 
institutional design strategy to the initiator’s choice model, which 
currently dominates the American system of overlapping jurisdictions. 
Randomizing choice of forum makes it more difficult for 
sophisticated parties to plan, prepare, and strategize in order to reach 
sympathetic courts.  It also makes it more difficult for courts that 
compete with other forums to strategically attract more valued 
litigants.  Random allocation can therefore save socially wasteful costs 
invested in shopping for forums or for parties.  At the same time, it 
supports the ideal of equal access to justice, insofar as better-off parties 
lose an opportunity to invest in advantageous forum shopping 
strategies.  Random allocation can thus be normatively defended by 
both efficiency-based and distributive-justice accounts. 
 
 
 
 
 9  This does not necessarily mean an equal distribution of cases to each forum, as 
lotteries can be weighted in favor of one alternative or another while maintaining their 
random qualities.  See infra text following note 48. 
 10  In Walden, the Supreme Court eventually found that only one of the two 
applicable forums had personal jurisdiction; the Ninth Circuit, however, did 
determine this to be a case of jurisdictional concurrence.  See supra note 6.  According 
the model suggested in this Article, the result of the Ninth Circuit’s decision would 
have been a jurisdictional lottery between the District of Nevada and the Northern 
District of Georgia. 
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Beyond mitigating the familiar efficiency and distribution 
concerns of forum shopping, the Random Allocation Model also 
ensures that the socially redeeming potential of jurisdictional 
concurrence gets tapped.  Randomizing forum selection means that, 
over time and given a sequence of random allocations, similar 
questions and similar fact patterns will reach divergent forums and be 
treated differently, thus producing a pluralism of judicial output, as well 
as an information-generating dynamic reminiscent of randomized-
experiment methods.  These ends are supported by a political-pluralist 
normative account of a legal order that reflects and respects the varied 
beliefs and expectations of members and communities in a diverse 
democracy.  At the same time, they enable comparison, 
experimentation, and learning between forums dealing with similar 
questions—in the tradition of the “jurisdictional laboratory” familiar 
from federalism discourse.11 
Persistent randomization thus ensures that over time no 
alternative from among the concurrent jurisdictions will defeat the 
others, so to speak; it replaces the natural-selection dynamics of forum 
shopping with an insistence on the preservation of multiple 
institutional and normative options, embodied in the diverse forums 
available under jurisdictional overlap.  The determination of the 
optimal degrees of jurisdictional diversity and concurrence is thus 
handed back to the deliberative processes of democratic policymaking, 
rather than to sophisticated, self-interested forum shoppers. 
Granted, the commitment to the rule of law—with its insistence 
on a rational and reasoned legal decision-making process—makes us 
inclined to regard randomization in judicial practices as an improper 
(normative) aberration (descriptive).  Yet, as several authors have 
lately explored, randomization is in fact prevalent in certain legal 
contexts, and particularly in the assigning of cases to judges and judges 
to panels—a procedure that essentially leaves a significant determinant 
of judicial outcome to sheer luck.12  The Article builds on this existing 
accommodation of case-dispositive randomization in the management 
of single courts in order to support its broader claim for the virtues of 
randomized case allocation throughout the system in conditions of 
jurisdictional concurrence. 
 
 11  See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 397–400 
(1997); Roberta Ramano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State 
Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209 (2006). 
 12  See Adam Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 47–
49 (2009) (“[T]he process of assigning cases to judges is pervaded with lotteries.”); 
Jeremy Waldron, Lucky in Your Judge, 9 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 185, 186 (2008) (“One 
might get lucky or unlucky in one’s judge.”). 
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The Article proceeds as follows: Part I briefly presents the forum 
shopping structure of jurisdictional concurrence and identifies several 
socially undesirable effects that result from letting the initiator of the 
litigation determine the forum and thereby affect the outcome.  The 
following two parts set the conceptual and institutional frameworks for 
the Random Allocation Model.  Part II unpacks the complex notion of 
randomness.  The discussion concentrates on the idea of equal 
procedural randomness, which entails the use of an ad hoc random 
choice mechanism (i.e., a lottery) to break distributive ties.  Part III 
examines the central occurrences of randomness in the American 
legal system.  The prevalent use of randomness in allocating cases 
among judges and assigning judges to panels is shown to reflect an 
acceptance of the integral role of random choice mechanisms in the 
process of producing judicial decisions. 
Part IV presents the positive normative argument for employing 
the Random Allocation Model in cases of jurisdictional overlap.  I 
argue that distributive justice, value pluralism, and better knowledge, 
as well as certain efficiency-related concerns, will all be better served 
by replacing forum shopping with randomized allocation.  This part 
also considers the central challenges to the Model and offers 
responses. 
I. THE FORUM SHOPPING CHALLENGE 
A. The Normative Pluralism of Diverse Jurisdictions 
The American court system—like any other common law 
system—is a complex network of institutional entities with diverse 
jurisdictional purviews and interaction arrangements.13  As such, it can 
be understood as an extrapolation of a single court with multiple 
judges—with the system as a whole constituting the court and with the 
individual judges constituting the various jurisdictional units.  Just as it 
is customary to evaluate individual judges in terms of diversity (of 
identity group (e.g., gender, race, or religion), political affiliation 
(e.g., conservative or liberal), and professional background (e.g., 
prosecutor, defender, academic, tax expert, or intellectual property 
 
 13  For detailed surveys of the jurisdictional diffusion of state court systems in the 
U.S., see COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, STATE COURT STRUCTURE CHARTS (Jan. 31, 2013), 
http://tinyurl.com/84ljxka.  See also Ori Aronson, Out of Many: Military Commissions, 
Religious Tribunals, and the Democratic Virtues of Court Specialization, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 231, 
247–52 (2011) (detailing instances of court proliferation in common law systems along 
several axes: subject-matter specialization, administrative adjudication, ADR, and 
international tribunals). 
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specialist)),14 it is common to assess the work of a court system—that is 
characterized by institutional diffusion—according to the different 
outcomes its multiple forums produce.  Indeed, regardless of whether 
the diffuse structure is an intentional design, a constructive 
exploration of the institutional foundations of adjudication must take 
into account the diversity of judicial forums as well as, importantly, the 
diversity of judicial results.15 
For example, the establishment of family courts or locally-based 
community or neighborhood courts is often intended to create a 
distinctive institutional atmosphere for the disposition of certain legal 
matters, for instance through unique litigation structures or a 
relaxation of procedural or evidentiary norms.16  Military forums, 
which adhere to an institutional culture that combines the legal and 
the martial, similarly reflect a separate vision of adjudication, designed 
to render the process more sensitive to the unique context of military 
normativity (e.g., by appointing commissioned officers as judge and 
jury).17  Courts that deal intensively with administrative law issues might 
develop a government-oriented bias even in non-related cases.18  
Additionally, entrusting federal courts with diversity jurisdiction based 
 
 14  See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? (2006) (examining 
panel results according to the appointing president’s party affiliation); Orley 
Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and the Judiciary: The 
Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 273–81 (1995) 
(assessing the impact of judge characteristics—political affiliation, age, gender, 
religion, experience, background—on case outcomes); Mark S. Hurwitz & Drew Noble 
Lanier, Diversity in State and Federal Appellate Courts: Change and Continuity Across 20 Years, 
29 JUST. SYS. J. 47 (2008) (examining judicial diversity in state and federal courts 
according to race, ethnicity, and gender). 
 15  See LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING THE COURTS 205–10, 220–26 (2011) 
(specialized courts are usually created with the purpose of impacting judicial policy in 
a given field, which is certainly the typical result of such institutional innovations). 
 16  See, e.g., Melissa L. Breger, Making Waves or Keeping the Calm?: Analyzing the 
Institutional Culture of Family Courts Through the Lens of Social Psychology Groupthink Theory, 
34 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 55, 65–66 (2010) (discussing “the therapeutic nature and 
relaxed procedures of family courts”); Jeffrey Fagan & Victoria Malkin, Theorizing 
Community Justice Through Community Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 897, 908 (2003) 
(community courts are designed to be “legal forums that are uniquely configured 
towards [the community’s] particular crimes and social problems”).  
 17  See, e.g., Ori Aronson, In/Visible Courts: Military Tribunals as Other Spaces, in 
SECRECY, NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE VINDICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 229–46 
(David Cole et al. eds., 2013) (discussing the deliberately distinct nature of military 
adjudication); Timothy C. MacDonnell, Military Commissions and Courts-Martial: A Brief 
Discussion of the Constitutional and Jurisdictional Distinctions Between the Two Courts, ARMY 
LAW., 19 (Mar. 2002) (reviewing unique institutional characteristics of military 
forums). 
 18  See, e.g., Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 
1437, 1489–91 (2012) (reviewing claims that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit has developed a pro-government bias). 
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on the expectation of lesser local bias19 reflects an assumption of an 
inherent divergence in judicial output between state and federal 
forums. 
Even the spatial diffusion of courts among towns, counties, 
districts, and states can be and often is explained as a mechanism for 
generating difference among distinct loci of adjudication.  Location-
based diffusion does not only make access to courts more feasible in 
large countries; it also allows for the enhancement of localizing 
qualities of adjudication, ensuring the sensitivity of judges and juries 
(and parole officers, attorneys, and court personnel) to the 
idiosyncrasies of their communities as well as the reflection of their 
varying sensibilities in procedural dynamics and judicial outcomes.20 
The diffuse judicial system is designed, then, as the producer of 
consequential normative pluralism: even if most legal norms are 
produced in fairly centralized processes (legislation and precedent-
setting), their interpretation and application are entrusted to multiple 
judicial units that are diverse across personal, institutional, and 
cultural dimensions.  This is a significant point, especially given that all 
these units are regularly required to come up with answers to very 
similar questions, such as the meaning of constitutional norms (e.g., 
due process and equal treatment), of general statutory or common-law 
standards (e.g., reasonableness and good faith), and of procedural 
norms (e.g., preclusion and venue).  Of course, at the apex of the 
judicial system is a single centralizing entity, the Supreme Court, which 
has the power to unify judicial output by way of appellate review that is 
backed by a regime of binding precedent.  But the reality is that the 
vast majority of judicial decisions that the system produces do not 
reach its highest courts,21 and for most litigants and for most issues, the 
diverse outcomes of these multiple (inferior) forums are the final 
expressions of judicial action. 
 
 
 19  See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 212–13 (1996). 
 20  See Richard T. Ford, Law’s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV. 843, 
906–22 (1999) (presenting the view of the benefits of localized adjudication and 
criticizing it); Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 4 (2010) (calling for the breaking up of notions of sovereignty in order to 
incorporate localist voice in a federalist mode of governance).  
 21  For example, in 2013, 56,475 appeals were filed with the twelve regional federal 
courts of appeals.  United States Courts, Table 1 U.S. Courts of Appeals Fiscal Years 
2009–2013, U. S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/ 
2013/us-courts-of-appeals.aspx (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).  During the same period, 
the 94 federal district courts handled with as many as 375,870 filings.  United States 
Courts, U.S. District Courts, U. S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/ 
JudicialBusiness/2013/us-district-courts.aspx (last visited Nov. 14, 2014). 
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The institutionalization of normative pluralism in judicial output 
mandates creating a mechanism for allocating disputes among the 
system’s units in a way that complies with its ideals of fairness and 
rationality.  This is the role of the rules of jurisdiction.  These rules 
usually follow some objective criterion that is supposed to rationally 
attach types of cases to measures of expertise, geographic proximity, 
forum interest, or other institutional markers of relevant courts.22  
Thus, subject-matter jurisdiction relates to the legal or factual 
foundations of a case or its subject, whereas personal jurisdiction has 
to do with the geographical elements of a case and the affiliations of 
the parties.  But under the current regime, the allocation process is 
not exhausted by the rules of jurisdiction.  In some circumstances, 
significant power rests with the parties themselves. 
B. Forum Shopping and Initiator’s Choice 
“[S]trategic manipulation of procedural rules is an inherent and 
permanent feature of our system.”23  The rules of jurisdiction enable 
sophisticated parties—those capable of planning for the contingency 
of litigation and of allocating the resources to prepare for that 
possibility—to plan their behavior in order to direct potential litigation 
to a preferred forum, with varying degrees of probability.  Such 
strategic behavior becomes relevant at two distinct periods in time: 
prior to dispute (during the creation and conduct of legal relations) 
and upon the initiation of litigation (after the dispute has already 
occurred).24 
Thus, at the preliminary stage, a sophisticated player can either 
situate her behavior in a certain location (country, state, district) in 
order to secure an advantage regarding the litigation forum25 or else, 
as is currently customary, contractually set a certain forum for future 
litigation.  Similarly, she can plan her activities to affect the application 
of subject-matter jurisdiction rules and bring future litigation to a 
favorable forum (e.g., cap the value of her transactions at the statutory 
minimum amount for keeping diversity litigation in state rather than 
 
 22  See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases 
between Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1236–46 (2004) (surveying 
the typical justifications for state-federal jurisdictional distinctions). 
 23  Alexandra D. Lahav, Recovering the Social Value of Jurisdictional Redundancy, 82 
TUL. L. REV. 2369, 2373 (2008). 
 24  On the ex-ante/ex-post distinction in civil procedure design, see generally 
Bruce L. Hay, Procedural Justice—Ex Ante vs. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1803 (1997). 
 25  See, e.g., Daniel Klerman, Personal Jurisdiction and Product Liability, 85 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1551 (2012) (arguing that given high transaction costs, personal jurisdiction rules 
enable producers to design their transactions to benefit from lenient forums). 
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federal court, or arrange her economic activities so that any disputes 
are channeled to a particular specialized forum). 
Yet not only are the jurisdiction rules susceptible to manipulation 
by sophisticated parties ex-ante, the very activation of the jurisdictional 
mechanism once litigation has been initiated is also susceptible, at least 
partially, to strategic behavior.  Thus, although the rules of jurisdiction 
were ostensibly designed to ensure an efficient and rational process of 
matching cases with forums, the system has, interestingly, not opted 
for a centralized allocation mechanism for filed cases.  One could 
easily imagine an administrative unit that receives all filed cases and 
distributes them to the appropriate forum—which is, in effect, what 
happens with the allocation of cases to judges within a single court.  
Instead, the typical adversarial system incorporates the agency of the 
case’s initiator into the initial choice of forum.26  The effective subjects 
of jurisdictional rules are the claimants, plaintiffs, and prosecutors who 
choose where to initiate proceedings from amongst the alternatives 
they believe to be available under law.  Only after this initial action can 
the system intervene and redirect the litigation if jurisdiction is lacking; 
and moreover, even that power is sometimes contingent on (timely) 
action by the opposing party.27 
Giving the initial choice of forum to the initiator of the litigation 
can be justified in efficiency-based terms by the premise that she has 
the best information (at this stage, at least) as to the most appropriate 
forum.  It can also reflect an appeal to moral notions of autonomy and 
choice within a system that is deeply rigid in structure.28  Regardless, it 
is noteworthy that whenever the system or opposing party fails to act to 
correct a jurisdictional flaw (or, in civil actions in the state-federal 
context, to use the right of removal),29 the initiator of the case in 
essence holds the exclusive power to determine the forum of litigation. 
The case in which the initiator’s advantage is most conspicuous is 
when the jurisdiction rules allow for the litigation of a given case in 
more than one forum.  This is the not uncommon state of 
jurisdictional overlap or, in Robert Cover’s terms, jurisdictional 
 
 26  See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) (“[T]he plaintiff’s 
choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.”). 
 27  See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1).  
 28  See Lahav, supra note 23, at 2376. 
 29  The behavioral status quo bias—the tendency to regard an existing state of 
affairs as the baseline from which divergence is costly—likely inhibits such corrections 
at least in some of the cases.  See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract 
Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 625–30 (1998); William Samuelson & Richard 
Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988). 
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“redundancy.”30  In such instances, the initiator’s agency is clear and 
obvious.  The law has deferred to her on choice of forum from among 
the jurisdictionally available alternatives.  There are several familiar 
examples in U.S. law such as the following: when personal jurisdiction 
laws permit a case to be litigated in more than one state; when venue 
laws allow for a case to be litigated in more than one federal district in 
a given state; and when subject-matter jurisdiction laws allow for a case 
to be litigated in either state or federal court.  In countries where 
terrorism suspects can be indicted in military forums, such as the U.S. 
(military commissions) or Israel (military courts), it is essentially left to 
the prosecutor to decide whether to indict in a military or civilian 
forum.31 
In such conditions of concurrent jurisdiction, the initiator 
legitimately exercises her power to determine the institutional setting 
of the litigation and, hence, also to affect its outcome, without 
investing any preparatory resources at the pre-litigation stage or risking 
a jurisdictional challenge in the post-filing stage (state-federal removal 
notwithstanding).  The centrality of parties’ agency in forum choice is 
particularly striking when we consider the suggested analogy between 
multiple judges within a single court and a diffuse network of forums 
within a court system.  On the one hand, within a given court, litigants 
have nearly no control over the identity of the judge or panel that will 
hear their case (though they do have limited control over the identity 
of jurors), and as demonstrated below, even the system itself gave up 
much of its control over this when it opted for random assignment of 
cases to judges.  On the other hand, when it comes to choice among 
several forums, the law has developed a set of jurisdictional norms that 
inform parties in advance of the alternative forums for litigation and 
encourage them to make post strategic choices, which typically work to 
the advantage of litigation initiators and sophisticated players and, 
sometimes, to the detriment of the general public interest. 
 
 
 30  Cover, supra note 7, at 639. 
 31  In the U.S., the most familiar case of late was that of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, 
alleged mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, who was initially supposed to be tried in 
federal court in New York, but was eventually arraigned before a military commission 
in Guantánamo Bay, thanks to congressional intervention.  See National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 § 1032, GPO.GOV, available at http:// 
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-111hrpt491/pdf/CRPT-111hrpt491.pdf  (prohibiting 
the transfer of Mohammed into the United States); Jane Mayer, The Trial: Eric Holder 
and the Battle over Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 15, 2010, at 52. 
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C. The Undesirable Effects of Forum Shopping  
The social ramifications of strategic forum shopping have long 
been the topic of research and critique, yielding varying normative 
positions.32  Without rehashing familiar arguments, I will point out 
three significant costs associated with the initiator’s choice model.  
Note that these costs relate specifically to the choice accorded to the 
initiator of the proceedings and not to the underlying condition of 
jurisdictional concurrence.  As others have argued and as I elaborate 
below, jurisdictional concurrence can be socially beneficial for various 
reasons.  It is the mechanism used for its activation—party choice—
that should raise concern and warrants rethinking.33  
Wasteful investment.  Parties that enjoy the ability to choose among 
alternative forums—either by strategically designing their transactions 
pre-dispute or by making the legally sanctioned choice of forum upon 
instigating litigation—have a rational incentive to invest resources in 
steering their case to the best forum available.  Again, under the 
pluralist premise of a diffuse court system, regardless of how strongly 
the different forums strive for uniformity of legal output, they will 
necessarily diverge to some extent on similar questions.  Thus, a 
rational party is bound to try to predict the possible outcomes of her 
litigation in the various available forums and work to direct her case to 
the forum expected to be most favorable to her interests.  Factors 
making a forum favorable can be, for example, greater judicial 
expertise, lower expected litigation costs, known ideological biases of 
the bench or jury pool, and a party’s political clout in a certain 
jurisdictional community or professional circle. 
Yet, normally investing resources in this kind of strategic 
planning—gathering information on beneficial forums followed by 
strategic forum shopping—is socially wasteful.  The different forums, 
and the jurisdictional rules that allocate cases among them, are usually 
 
 32  See, e.g., Cover, supra note 7; Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
1677 (1990) (noting the use of forum shopping can lead to the enforcement of certain 
rights, while questioning the extent of its possible abuse); Mary Garvey Algero, In 
Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look at Selecting a Venue, 78 NEB. L. REV. 79 (1999) 
(questioning the ethical stigma often attached to strategic forum shopping); Scott E. 
Atkinson at al., The Economics of a Centralized Judiciary: Uniformity, Forum Shopping, and 
the Federal Circuit, 52 J.L. & ECON. 411 (2009) (exhibiting empirically the use of forum 
shopping in patent litigation); Nita Ghei & Francesco Parisi, Adverse Selection and Moral 
Hazard in Forum Shopping: Conflicts Law as Spontaneous Order, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1367 
(2004) (reviewing the costs of forum shopping and finding their alleviation in choice 
of law doctrines); Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: From Erie and 
Klaxon to CAFA and Shady Grove, 106 NW. U.L. REV. 1, 32–33 (2012) (discussing the 
normative ambivalence of forum shopping). 
 33  See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 1. 
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designed to attach to objective characteristics of genuine human 
activity, not to influence that activity.34  To the extent that jurisdictional 
concurrence is the product of a deliberate design, a system’s choice of 
concurrence can only express indifference regarding the forum in 
which the odd case lands from among the available alternatives.  Each 
forum is as socially desirable as the other; otherwise, concurrence 
would not be the rule.  Investing resources in directing a case to one 
forum rather than another is, therefore, wasteful; it entails costs but 
affects only distribution (often detrimentally, as momentarily noted) 
and not welfare. 
In some circumstances, the initiator’s choice model also 
incentivizes the forums themselves—the “supply side”—to invest 
resources to draw more cases to their jurisdiction.  This competitive 
dynamic is not necessarily wasteful as forums might be driven to 
improve the quality of justice they provide.35  But in certain market 
conditions, it can also lead to monopolistic results (e.g., the Delaware 
chancery court is often viewed in such terms36) or to a self-defeating 
“race to the bottom.”37  Supply-side competition can also be wasteful 
when forums attempt to attract “valued” litigants or cases, such as those 
that are more interesting, more famous, more income-generating, or 
cheaper to resolve (thanks to better evidence, for example).  Here, too, 
the original rationales for the jurisdictional delimitations are subverted 
for irrelevant purposes.38 
Distributive Outcomes.  The capacity of certain parties to influence 
ex-ante the future choice of forum and of initiating parties to choose 
the forum can often empower strong, well-off, and sophisticated 
parties—Marc Galanter’s “haves.”39  Those parties with better 
information (or the means to invest in information-gathering), with a 
greater capability for strategic planning and behavior, and with an 
ability to act quickly upon the initiation of litigation are more likely to 
 
 34  See, e.g., Note, supra note 32, at 1691–92; Klerman, supra note 25. 
 35  See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 
1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 227–32 (1985) (reviewing literature that has “outlined the 
economic forces that would generate beneficial state competition” in the corporate 
registration market). 
 36  See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 
55 STAN. L. REV. 679 (2002). 
 37  See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits 
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992); William L. Cary, 
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974). 
 38  See, e.g., LOPUCKI, supra note 1. 
 39  Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 LAW & SOC. REV. 95 (1974). 
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make beneficial use of jurisdictional concurrence.40 
It is true that in some classes of cases, the initiator’s choice model 
seems to benefit the paradigmatically worse-off party.  Consider civil 
rights cases, consumer protection actions, and certain employment-
related suits: the initiator of the litigation is normally the weaker party 
in the dispute in all three classes of cases.  It would seem, then, that at 
least in these contexts, the initiator’s choice model in fact helps to 
empower the worse-off parties.  But there are two qualifications to this 
point: first, there are significant areas of the law in which the initiator’s 
choice model inevitably benefits the stronger party, most notably 
criminal cases and administrative enforcement proceedings; second, 
the advantage enjoyed by certain weakened parties under the 
initiator’s choice model usually materializes only once the litigation is 
initiated.  Prior to that, sophisticated parties can affect the choice of 
available forums even as putative defendants (through choice-of-forum 
clauses or deliberate business practices) and thereby limit the 
redistributive potential of forum shopping. 
Public-Private Divergence.  Although a system of concurrent 
jurisdictions is assumed to be indifferent as to the eventual placement 
of any given case among the available alternatives, it may still have a 
preference regarding the overall distribution of cases among the 
relevant forums.  To the extent that the forum-shopping model is not 
concerned solely with maximizing party agency, it should be expected 
to promote other social interests, unrelated to individual autonomy.  
These may be administrative concerns of caseload mitigation, or more 
substantive institutional purposes, such as attaching a degree of 
specialization to specific forums, preventing the over-insularity of 
forums by diversifying dockets, producing a diverse judicial output by 
assigning similar cases to different forums, or countering distributive 
unfairness by constraining the use of forum shopping in “suspect” 
circumstances. 
Interestingly, the forum shopping model offers no assurances of 
serving any such public-regarding considerations.  Parties using their 
prerogative of choosing a forum of their liking among the overlapping 
alternatives are expected to make that choice normally according to 
their own, self-regarding interests.  These may coincidentally converge 
with the public interest in case distribution, but can also often diverge, 
leading to overall results that contradict the public reasons for 
 
 40  See, e.g., Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 
CORNELL L. REV. 481, 489 & n.36 (2011) (discussing the incentive for gathering 
information on relevant court generated by a forum shopping system, and noting its 
specific relevance to repeat litigants). 
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jurisdictional concurrence. 
Consider, for example, the market justifications for forum 
shopping.  These often rest on party choice as a mechanism for 
comparing forums, which gradually coalesces around a preferred 
alternative in a natural-selection-like process.  While such a dynamic 
can promote a certain notion of institutional efficiency, it could also 
conflict with other social goals, such as maintaining the normative 
diversity of judicial output over time.  Under the initiator’s choice 
model, only public goals that overlap with private interests can be 
pursued.  The system essentially forgoes public interests that are not 
reliant upon, or that wholly deviate from, the preferences of individual 
litigants.41 
* * * 
There is, therefore, ample reason to call for a reconsideration of 
the initiator’s choice model, given the detrimental effects of forum 
shopping which include: the wasteful strategic investment; the 
potential distributive advantage sophisticated parties tend to derive 
from the practice; and the likely divergence between private and 
public considerations.  Below, I suggest that a random allocation 
mechanism might allay some of these costs and effects, while also 
supporting pluralism and knowledge-seeking in the legal system.  To 
set the conceptual stage for my normative argument, I will first unpack 
the idea of randomness and survey its existing, if somewhat latent, 
presence in the legal system. 
II. THE TURN TO RANDOMNESS 
A. What Randomness Means 
There are several meanings attributed to the idea of randomness, 
each with a distinct reference and use.  Most notably, randomness can 
define the process of reaching a decision, but it can also relate to the 
result of that process.  For example, when we describe Jackson 
Pollock’s paint drippings or John Cage’s tone variations as “random,” 
we usually do not mean that their works were created without planning 
or intention, but rather that they were designed to make it difficult to 
identify an organizing pattern within them.  This kind of randomness 
can be described as consequential.  It exists wherever it is impossible 
to derive an organizing principle from a given set of data or decisions 
 
 41 See Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social 
Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575 (1997) (presenting a general 
theory—focused on efficiency-related costs—of the divergence between the private 
and the public interests in managing the litigation system). 
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and, therefore, also impossible to predict the next piece of data or 
decision from those that preceded it.42  Consequential randomness can 
be an end in itself, such as when it is intended to make acclimation, 
reliance, or planning more difficult for those tracking a series of events 
(as in an agent subject to surprise reviews by a principal).  
Consequential randomness can also serve as a proxy for randomness 
in the process leading up to the result, where the process itself is not 
visible.  However, mathematically valid consequential randomness is 
very difficult to attain43 and it is a problematic indicator of randomness 
in the process, in being subject to diverse manipulations.44 
In this Article, the use of “randomness” will refer to a second 
central type—that which appears in the process of reaching a decision.  
Procedural randomness occurs when the decider suspends her own 
discretion and employs instead a decision mechanism whose outcome 
she (or anyone else) cannot control.  This kind of randomness 
involves, therefore, two related elements: uncontrollability and 
unpredictability.45  A random decision-making process ensures that the 
outcome of the process cannot be influenced, nor predicted, in 
advance.  Procedural randomness takes two main forms: arbitrary 
randomness, which is weak randomness, and equal randomness, which 
is strong randomness. 
Arbitrary procedural randomness characterizes decision 
mechanisms in which the choice is made based on a criterion that is 
irrelevant to the issue being decided and cannot be controlled by the 
decider at the time of the decision.46  Thus, for example, a rule that 
divides students into two classes according to date of birth (e.g., 
January-June into group A, July-December into group B) is an arbitrary 
random rule.  It is arbitrary because date of birth is irrelevant to any 
rational student placement policy.  It is random because students’ 
dates of birth are determined before the time of allocation and 
 
 42  Oren Perez, The Institutionalisation of Inconsistency: From Fluid Concepts to Random 
Talk, in PARADOXES AND INCONSISTENCIES IN THE LAW 119, 137–38 (Oren Perez & 
Gunther Teubner eds., 2006).  
 43  DEBORAH J. BENNETT, RANDOMNESS 132–51 (1998).  The most familiar 
metaphoric example of this challenge is mathematician Émile Borel’s prediction of 
the typing monkey who would eventually reproduce the works of Shakespeare.  See 
Émile Borel, La Mécanique Statique et L’irréversibilité [Static Mechanics and Irreversibility], 
3 JOURNAL DE PHYSIQUE THÉORIQUE ET APPLIQUÉE [J. PHYS.] 189 (1913) (Fr.).  
 44  See JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS 40–43 (1989) (the producer of a series 
can design it in a way that will make it seem random, relying on people’s tendency to 
assume randomness based on an insufficient sample). 
 45  See BENNETT, supra note 43, at 152–73. 
 46  See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Just Lotteries, 24 SOC. SCI. INFO. 
483, 488–91 (1988); Samaha, supra note 12, at 16–17. 
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irrespective of it.  The decider therefore cannot control which student 
will be assigned to which class, and the rule-maker cannot know in 
advance which students will have which dates of birth.  What we get is 
a combination of arbitrariness, reflected in the lack of rational 
connection between the criterion and the purpose, and randomness, 
deriving from the predetermination of membership in the group 
defined by the criterion. 
Such arbitrary random decision mechanisms raise complex issues 
of fairness.  They decide a person’s fate based on an immutable 
characteristic that she cannot control (her date of birth, in our 
example) and thus recall practices of gender or racial discrimination.  
Indeed, over time, such decision mechanisms may lead to 
discrimination if they preserve differential treatment of members of 
different groups (even if the preliminary distinction between the 
groups appeared to be arbitrary, such as a person’s date of birth).  
Moreover, arbitrary decision rules may be susceptible to manipulation 
(which removes their arbitrariness), and as such, they may benefit 
those who can plan ahead and act strategically (e.g., a rule for the 
inspection of every fifth person going through airport security seems 
arbitrary, but can in fact be used by strategic actors planning ahead to 
enable them to avoid inspection).  The more manipulable the 
mechanism, the less uncertain its outcomes, and it thus loses its 
random qualities. 
Equal procedural randomness adds another requirement, beyond 
the arbitrariness of the result.  In order to be equal, the randomness 
has to renew in each and every decision, so it cannot rely on a fixed 
choice criterion.  Equal procedural randomness therefore requires an 
ad hoc lottery in the choice from among given alternatives in each and 
every instance.  In our example, an equal random decision mechanism 
would entail a lottery among all cohort members to assign them to the 
two available classes.  Such a rule is equal because at any given time—
until the point of decision—each member of the relevant group has a 
genuinely equal chance of ending up with any of the results (regardless 
of her date of birth, last name, or place in a line).  Pure equal 
procedural randomness requires equal probabilities of arriving at any 
of the possible results.  Such a lottery ensures equal treatment of those 
subject to it, in both its disregard for any immutable characteristics as 
well as its lack of bias toward any one outcome over another for each 
of the group members.47  The coin flip is the paradigmatic example of 
pure equal procedural randomness; the roll of a die is another (the 
 
 47  This is also known as a “fair” lottery (see Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 46, at 
485) or “statistical” one (see Samaha, supra note 12, at 9–10). 
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difference between the mechanisms is the number of alternatives from 
which they can choose—two compared with six).  Equal randomness 
that is based on an ad hoc lottery fully complies with the uncertainty 
criterion, and as such, it allows those subject to it to prepare, at the very 
most, for the relevant probabilities of ending up with each result.48 
As we will see below, there may be conditions in which it is justified 
to intentionally bias the lottery, so that certain outcomes are more 
likely than others.  It is important to note, however, that a biased lottery 
retains all of the procedural elements of equal randomness, both in 
that the fates of those subject to the lottery are determined ad hoc 
(regardless of preexisting characteristics) and in that the biased 
probability applies equally to all participants (thus, in a 90/10 bias, 
every participant has a 90 percent chance of ending up with option A 
and a 10 percent chance of ending up with option B). 
B. Some Features of Procedural Randomness 
There are several remarkable features to decision-making 
mechanisms that employ procedural randomness.  Significantly, they 
are relatively cheap to operate, they “sterilize” the decision-making 
process by eliminating human discretion, and they ensure a plurality 
of outcomes over a sequence of decisions.  Each of these features is 
considered in a little more detail below.  Note, however, that these are 
not (yet) presented as necessary advantages of randomness, but rather 
as features that might prove useful to further certain normative 
visions—as will be argued in following sections.49 
Cost.  Perhaps the most prominent feature of a random decision 
mechanism is its relatively low cost.  A random rule will normally be 
cheaper than its alternatives, since it requires devising only a single 
mechanism that is used repeatedly, thus averting the costs related to 
case-specific discretion.50Accordingly, when cost effectiveness 
dominates all other considerations, randomness is often the 
reasonable decision-making method, at least from the perspective of 
the institution with the decision-making authority.51  A classic example 
 
 48  Samaha, supra note 12, at 17. 
 49  See infra Part IV.A. 
 50  Of course, creating a mechanism that would ensure a truly random (“50/50”) 
series of coin flips is a considerable scientific challenge: one would need to control, 
e.g., for type of coin, erosion of metal, angle of spin, stability of flipping mechanism, 
degree of air resistance, and landing surface.  See Persi Diaconis et al., Dynamical Bias 
in the Coin Toss, 49 SOC. INDUS. APPLIED MATH. REV. 211 (2007); Joseph B. Keller, The 
Probability of Heads, 93 AM. MATH. MONTHLY 191 (1986). 
 51  This may not be the case from the perspective of those subject to the lottery: 
they might in fact incur new costs due to the shift from reason to randomness, 
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is the line at the post office or bus stop.  In these contexts, it is usually 
accepted that, assuming all customers will eventually be served, 
investing resources in weighing the comparative urgency of each 
person’s needs (a question that some moral principle can certainly 
apply to) is a waste that is best saved by relying on random sorting 
based on a “first come first served” heuristic.52 
But its low cost is not the only appealing feature of a random 
decision-making process.  Such a process—especially in its equal 
form—has additional unique qualities that may be relevant in selecting 
a choice mechanism and may justify the choice of randomness 
regardless of procedural efficiency.  Two such noteworthy qualities are 
sterility and multiplicity. 
Sterility.  A significant characteristic of randomness is the “sterile” 
nature of the process.53  A truly random mechanism eliminates the 
resort to any and all reasons—both good and bad, and relevant and 
irrelevant—in the decision-making process.  This means that a 
decision-maker using a random choice mechanism is exempt from 
considering reasons and, therefore, also from the responsibility 
entailed by reason-based decisions.  If you take account of reasons, you 
might go wrong; if you flip a coin, you are free of the burden of error. 
In addition, randomizing also renders the decider “untouchable.”  
It is very difficult to corrupt a random choice mechanism, especially 
one that is publicly visible.  In this respect, randomness can operate as 
a defense mechanism against undue pressures in the decision-making 
process.  At the price of giving up relevant reasons, we secure the 
absence of irrelevant ones, and thus the decider is completely neutral.54  
Finally, the sterility of the process is the foundation of its formal 
equality.  Because no other factors are involved in the decision-making 
process beyond the random mechanism, it necessarily treats all those 
subject to it as complete and formal equals and eliminates all personal 
 
especially if they are risk averse.  I return to these concerns further on infra Part 
IV.B(2) 
 52  See Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of 
Property, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 667, 670 (1986) (“Time offers a unique measuring rod, 
sufficient in principle to resolve two or two thousand competing claims for priority.  
Whoever got there first, wins . . . . [A]n enormous decision-making capability is 
contained in a single variable.”).  Still, not every line is random: in conditions that 
allow for planning, a person may invest (socially wasteful) resources in getting to line 
early in the morning, for example.  A genuinely random line is a group of patients in 
the ER, who usually do not time their accidents to align with the hospital’s slow hours.  
See ELSTER, supra note 44, at 70–72. 
 53  See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 46, at 489 (discussing the “sanitary” quality 
of procedural randomness). 
 54  See Perez, supra note 42, at 138. 
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or systemic preferences or biases, conscious or otherwise. 
Plurality.  Another noteworthy, though often overlooked, quality 
of the random process is the multiplicity of results it ensures over a 
sequence of decisions.  As with any heuristic, random choice 
mechanisms come into play when a decider has to choose among 
multiple alternatives.  In this context, randomness is normally 
understood to serve as a tie-breaker when the decider has exhausted 
all rational reasons to choose one alternative over the others.  
Randomness thus emerges from conditions of multiplicity.  But what 
makes it a unique kind of heuristic is that it also ensures multiplicity as 
a consequence, given a series of decisions over time.  One of the qualities 
of reason-based decision rules is that they produce uniform decisions 
over time, so that in repeated instances of choice between similar 
alternatives, the same choice is likely to be made each time around.  A 
random decision mechanism, in contrast, guarantees that over a series 
of decisions, all of the available alternatives will eventually be chosen 
and represented in the choice sequence.  Randomness thus begins 
from multiplicity, but also ends (over time) in multiplicity.  A random 
decision rule means indifference (ex-ante) with respect to different 
alternatives; but equally as important, it reflects (ex-post) willingness—
indeed, interest—that all of the alternatives will remain available as a 
result of the rule’s use. 
III. RANDOMNESS IN LAW 
The rule of law, which guides contemporary liberal democracies, 
mandates a measure of stability and coherence in a legal system’s 
norms, so that its subjects can predict the legal results of their actions 
to a reasonable degree of certainty.55  At the same time, the rule of law 
also requires equal treatment—the law should apply uniformly to all 
its subjects, in the absence of a rational differentiating factor that 
justifies disparate treatment.  Under the rule of law paradigm, any 
change to the normative field must be accompanied by a reasoned 
justification expressed through a legitimate decision-making 
procedure.56  This is the case, for example, with parliamentary debate 
on a draft bill, judicial reasoning, and the administrative consultation 
 
 55  See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 46–91 (rev. ed. 1969); BRIAN Z. 
TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW 91–101 (2004). 
 56  See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure 4 (N.Y.U. 
Sch. of Law, Pub. L. & Legal Theory Research Working Paper No. 10–73, 2010), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1688491 (stating that necessary conditions for 
legitimate use of public force include a hearing before a tribunal that provides rational 
justifications for its decisions). 
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process.  These are all institutional procedures aimed at making 
decision-makers rely on rational arguments. 
Under this paradigm then, a random decision rule—that is, a rule 
that subjects the application of a norm, or the discretion of its 
interpreter, to an uncontrollable and unpredictable process like a coin 
flip or dice roll—contradicts both the certainty and equality principles 
at the base of the rule of law.  Randomness undermines certainty 
because the person subject to the norm does not know whether the 
norm will actually apply to her and, therefore, has difficulty planning 
her behavior.57  Randomness undermines equality because without 
control over the application of the norm, two people who are similar 
in all relevant respects might still have different outcomes.  In addition, 
randomness entails arbitrariness in that the application of a norm is 
not contingent on intelligible reasons, but on fate.  At least some of 
the liberal notions of human dignity will deem this an affront to a 
person’s right not to be subject to treatment that is grounded on 
irrational decision-making processes.58  
Yet, in certain circumstances, common law legal systems do 
employ random decision rules.  In many systems, like the U.S., legal 
randomness arises primarily in two typical situations: (1) at the 
substantive rights level, with respect to the ultimate allocation of 
indivisible resources; and (2) in the procedural context, with respect 
to the allocation of cases among judges and assignment of judges to 
judicial panels.59  Systematic thought on randomness in law has 
therefore been devoted mostly to explaining and critiquing these two 
contexts—the first as a rare anomaly in the rational field of substantive 
legal norms and the second as a prevalent phenomenon in judicial 
administration.60  I discuss each of these contexts separately, followed 
by an assessment of what these instances teach us about the limits and 
 
 57  Randomness does not eliminate all certainty.  In fact, it introduces an element 
of risk, which we can take into account given our degree of risk aversion and the 
availability of means for protecting against it (i.e., insurance).  Of course, in order to 
properly deal with risk, we need information—primarily, the probability of risk 
embodied in the random norm. 
 58  See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 12, at 191; Yuval Eylon & Alon Harel, The Right to 
Judicial Review, 92 VA. L. REV. 991, 1002–06 (2006). 
 59  See, e.g., NEIL DUXBURY, RANDOM JUSTICE 44–45 (1999) (enumerating examples 
of random allocation mechanisms in these two kinds of cases in the U.S., the U.K., 
New Zealand, Israel, and the European community, among others).  
 60  See, most notably, Samaha, supra note 12, a seminal survey of the use of 
randomness in law in general and in intra-court case assignment procedures in 
particular.  Our contributions however diverge: unlike Samaha’s, this Article asserts an 
overtly normative claim, which leads to distinct emphases in the conceptual 
groundwork as well. 
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possibilities of irrationality in a judicial system committed to the ideal 
of the rule of law. 
A. Allocation of Indivisible Resources 
The most common lottery context in rational legal systems is 
when there are multiple justified claims of equal legal weight to an 
indivisible good or resource.61  Consider, for example, the allocation 
of a chattel inheritance, an organ for transplant, or a public housing 
apartment among claimants with equally strong entitlements.  Another 
set of cases in this category is when a good is divisible but the divided 
parts will be necessarily different, so the dispute among the claimants 
will transform into a competition over the better part.  Division of real 
property is the classic example here. 
In such disputes, it is possible that the available heuristics of 
substantive law will be exhausted, without pointing to a rational 
preference of one claimant over the others.  Moreover, the market 
mechanisms of allocation might also be unavailable due to a lack of 
bargaining resources or information, prohibitive transaction costs, 
difficulties in translating distinct preferences into exchangeable terms, 
or a deontological aversion to certain kinds of barters.  One of two 
results is then possible: either the allocation is canceled so that no one 
receives the good, and consequential equality is maintained; or else 
the good is allocated only to some members of the claimant group, 
based on a criterion that is irrelevant to the moral foundation of the 
claimants’ initial eligibility. 
In its general reluctance to refrain from allocations—an option 
that is viewed as both wasteful (and thus inefficient) and status-quo-
preserving (and thus potentially distributively unjust)—the legal 
system sometimes resorts to a decision rule that is arbitrary but still fair.  
Such a rule must determine who will receive the indivisible good, but 
without taking into account differentiating factors that were excluded 
in the initial allocation process.  As we have seen, an ad hoc lottery 
satisfies these conditions, while guaranteeing all justified claimants 
equal chances of receiving the good or resource.62  And, indeed, many 
legal systems sanction the use of a lottery as a tie-breaking means 
among parties with an equal claim to a finite, indivisible resource.63 
 
 61  See Samaha, supra note 12, at 33–34. 
 62  For a detailed development of this justification, see Peter Stone, Why Lotteries 
Are Just, 15 J. POL. PHIL. 276, 287–88 (2007). 
 63  See, e.g., Samaha, supra note 12, at 33 (applying a lottery system for tie-breakers 
regarding land partition claims); Carol Necole Brown, Casting Lots: The Illusion of Justice 
and Accountability in Property Allocation, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 65, 114–24 (2005) (applying a 
ARONSON (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2015  5:12 PM 
2015] FORUM BY COIN FLIP 85 
Legal scholars have suggested extending the use of random 
allocation mechanisms to even more complex contexts.  For example, 
Akil Amar famously explored the idea of an election mechanism 
whereby the ballot count is followed by a lottery among candidates that 
is biased relative to the share of votes each earned in the election (e.g., 
a candidate who won 60 percent of the votes will have a 60 percent 
chance of winning the contested seat, rather than a 100 percent 
chance as is the case today).  Such an arrangement treats the power of 
government like an indivisible resource, to which potential access 
ought to be guaranteed for all groups, including minorities.64  Several 
authors have invoked the possibility of a lottery to allocate child 
custody between separated parents (at least where joint custody is 
unavailable).65  Such a rule represents a practicable solution for a judge 
who lacks a rational reason for preferring one parent over the other; 
but it also has an expressive quality with respect to the child, who is 
spared the experience of a judge assessing the parenting skills of her 
mother and father.  In a different context, a random distribution of 
small-claims class action proceeds was recently suggested, proposing 
that a few plaintiffs be randomly selected from the plaintiffs’ class and 
paid sums larger than their individual claims.66   In this case, the 
resource up for allocation (the proceeds fund) is in fact divisible, but 
the costs of distribution among all class members would be 
prohibitively high.67 
It is noteworthy, despite scholarly suggestions, that random 
distribution mechanisms are not, in fact, usually used in socially crucial 
contexts.  We usually do not decide child custody by coin flip;68 we do 
not elect our leaders by a roll of the dice.  This reality reflects a deeply 
 
lottery system for tie-breakers regarding education rights). 
 64  Akil Reed Amar, Note, Choosing Representatives by Lottery Voting, 93 YALE L.J. 1283 
(1984).  On the frequent use of lotteries in election procedures from ancient Greece 
to the Renaissance, see DUXBURY, supra note 59, at 26–32. 
 65  See Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of 
Indeterminacy, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 289–91 (1975); ELSTER, supra note 44, at 
171–72. 
 66  Shay Lavie, Reverse Sampling: Holding Lotteries to Allocate the Proceeds of Small-Claims 
Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1065 (2011). 
 67  See id. at 1071–73. 
 68  See In re Brown, 662 N.W.2d 733 (Mich. 2003), where a judge was reprimanded 
for flipping a coin to decide whether a divorced couple’s children would spend 
Christmas Eve with the father or the mother’s parents.  As part of the disciplinary 
proceedings, the judge promised to “[r]efrain from resolving any disputed issue by the 
flip of a coin.”  Id. at 737.  See also Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm’n of Va. v. Shull, 
651 S.E.2d 648 (Va. 2007) (disciplining a judge who flipped a coin in order to decide 
where the children would spend the better part of a holiday vacation, after the parents 
had failed to reach an agreement). 
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entrenched aversion, documented in behavioral research,69 as well as 
moral argument,70 to random determination of “substantive” 
distributive questions—ethical, legal, or political.71  This aversion is 
particularly striking given the conspicuous willingness to employ such 
mechanisms in central aspects of judicial administration.  To that the 
Article now turns. 
B. Case Allocation and Panel Assignment 
The second instance of procedural randomness in law is 
ostensibly unrelated to the determination of contests of rights, but 
rather concerns the management of the judicial process itself.  
Common law court systems often resort to random mechanisms in 
allocating cases among judges, as well as in assigning judges to panels, 
within a single court.72  Although this institutional phenomenon is 
significantly more widespread and entrenched than the unique cases 
of indivisible resource allocation, it is fairly obscured and does not 
normally draw much concern.73 
Why do legal systems employ random mechanisms to allocate 
cases and assign judicial panels?  This could reflect a systemic 
presumption that all judges are similar enough in all relevant respects, 
and so random distribution is merely the cheapest mechanism for 
assigning cases when the court is indifferent to the allocation results; 
but this is an unconvincing explanation.  It seems reasonable that if 
pure institutional efficiency were the objective, then allocation policies 
would be pulled toward specialization rather than randomness.  
Sending similar kinds of cases to the same judge (and joining groups 
of judges in fixed panels) would ensure, over time, greater 
specialization and thus, cheaper disposition. 
 
 69  See, e.g., Gideon Keren & Karl H. Teigen, Decisions by Coin Toss: Inappropriate But 
Fair, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 83, 98–100 (2010). 
 70  See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 178–84 (1986) (random application of a 
legal norm violates the integrity requirement of a just legal system); see also Brown, 
supra note 63, at 114 (“Lotteries, by their nature, are fundamentally unreasoned and 
unexplained because of their randomness.  Therefore, their use in making decisions 
with legal consequences offends generally recognized notions of distributive justice.”). 
 71  Contrary examples do, however, exist: for years, the U.S. drafted its soldiers into 
wartime service by lottery, when life and death were literally on the line.  See GEORGE 
Q. FLYNN, CONSCRIPTION AND DEMOCRACY: THE DRAFT IN FRANCE, GREAT BRITAIN AND THE 
UNITED STATES 38 (2002). 
 72  See, e.g., Samaha, supra note 12; Ashenfelter et al., supra note 14, at 266–70 
(concluding empirically that three surveyed federal district courts assign cases mostly 
randomly); Matthew Hall, Randomness Reconsidered: Modeling Random Judicial Assignment 
in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 574 (2010). 
 73  The notable exception is Adam Samaha’s detailed treatment of this topic in 
Samaha, supra note 12, at 47–81. 
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A more persuasive explanation seems to be that the random 
allocation of cases among judges is in fact intended to deal with the 
reality of judicial heterogeneity: the resort to randomness is not the 
result of judicial sameness, but rather of judicial divergence.  Indeed, the 
common understanding in the legal-realist world is that reasonable 
judges may and often do arrive at different answers to similar 
questions.74  This understanding might be based on a theory of the 
indeterminacy of the legal norm,75 a conception of the strong 
discretion allowed in hard cases,76 the limits of human reason in its 
search for a single correct answer,77 or the recognition that judges’ 
doctrinal commitments are sometimes trumped by their ideological 
ones.78  Whatever the underlying theory, if we accept that the fate of a 
case depends on, among other factors, the identity of the judge or 
panel to which it has been allocated, and if these links of dependency 
can be identified, then the person in charge of case distribution turns 
out to have a great deal of influence over the contents of judicial 
outcomes.  A random allocation mechanism removes this influence by 
preventing the system from allocating cases according to expected 
results.  At the same time, an equal random allocation mechanism 
ensures every litigant ex-ante equal chances of reaching each and every 
judge, and it eliminates the capacity of sophisticated parties to steer 
their cases to a specific judge within a given court. 
Random case distribution therefore sanitizes the process by 
ridding it of two kinds of external influences: the ability of allocating 
agents to abuse the system, on the one hand, and the strategic 
advantages of sophisticated parties, on the other.  It eliminates 
intentional (or negligent) discrimination in a corrupted assignment 
process, as well as distributive discrimination between haves and have-
nots.  In addition, a random allocation mechanism expresses a systemic 
indifference to the differences among judges and thereby serves to 
legitimate courts’ image as forums of impartial adjudication. 
 
 
 74  See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLITICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4 (2008) (“Judges do not operate in a vacuum, and 
their worldviews inevitably—and properly—shape their rulings in hard cases . . . .  
Especially in important cases, reasonable judges may differ about the correct 
outcome.”). 
 75  See Menachem Mautner, Luck in the Courts, 9 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 217, 219–23 
(2007). 
 76  See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 132–39 (2d ed. 1994). 
 77  See DWORKIN, supra note 70, at 263–66. 
 78  See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 152–56 (1997); SUNSTEIN ET 
AL., supra note 14. 
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But this, of course, is not the full story.  As other commentators 
have already noted, the solution developed to eliminate discrimination 
(or the appearance thereof) in the case allocation process raises 
important concerns of discrimination ex-post facto.  For random 
allocation of cases among judges within a court means embedding in 
the judicial process a significant irrational element: luck.  The severity 
of a sentence in a criminal case or the probability of winning a (non-
jury) civil case is determined by, among other factors, the sheer luck 
of the case’s allocation to one judge rather than another.79  From a 
consequentialist point of view, similar matters regularly receive 
disparate treatment, in random fashion and without any rational 
reason for the distinction (not even a bad reason, as lotteries are 
“sterile”), except for the original interest in preventing manipulation 
of the allocation process and lowering its cost.80 
Considering the judicial system’s typical aversion to deciding 
judicial proceedings by lottery,81 the commonplace use of randomness 
in case allocation, as well as the matter-of-factness with which it is 
accepted, raises questions and, accordingly, attempts at justification82 
and rectification.83  At the same time, this apparent tolerance could 
also offer important hints as to the limits of acceptable randomization 
in the legal system.  Randomness in the judicial decision is shunned, 
whereas randomness in judicial administration is allowed.  The judge 
may not flip a coin, but the court registrar may certainly do so. 
 
 79  See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 12, at 209; Mautner, supra note 75, at 222; Samaha, 
supra note 12, at 5. 
 80  But see Perez, supra note 42, at 141–42 (opting for a random choice process 
necessitates a substantive position in favor of randomness and, as such, cannot be 
neutral). 
 81  See Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 841 (1984) (“Whether a judge’s 
internal mental process, when pronouncing a sentence of twenty or thirty days, actually 
amounts to anything more than a coin flip, the community wishes judicial rulings at 
least to appear to be the product of contemplative, deliberative, cognitive processes.”).  
Prominent Israeli Chief Justice Aharon Barak has stated that in choosing among 
several reasonable interpretive alternatives, “the judge may not flip a coin.”  HCJ 
547/84 Of Ha’Emek v. Local Council Ramat-Yishai 40(1) PD 113, 141 [1986] (Isr.). 
 82  See Samaha, supra note 12, at 70–81.  Randomized case assignment can be 
explained as a means of “sensible allocation of indivisible resources [of judicial 
excellence] across apparently equal claims, and reliable experimentation on judicial 
behavior.”  Id. at 75. 
 83  See Mautner, supra note 75, at 224–34 (noting that in order to diminish the role 
of luck in adjudication, the system should be designed such that each individual 
outcome approximates the average position all of the system’s judges would have taken 
on a similar question).  For a critique of the normative and practical viability of the 
suggested model, see Daphna Hacker, Lack of Luck in the Courts: A Comment on 
Menachem Mautner, 9 THEORETICAL INQ. L. FORUM 38 (2007). 
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C. The Legitimate Lottery Paradox: Between Adjudication and 
Administration 
What is the source of the divide between the legal system’s deep 
aversion to random judicial decision-making, on the one hand, and 
the presence of randomness in the case-allocation stage, on the other?  
A plausible explanation is that this divide, which we might term the 
legitimate lottery paradox,84 reflects the public image of the court and, 
more specifically, the way legal systems have constructed the judge as 
the focal core of judicial action.  The elusive notion of “public 
confidence” in the courts, to which judicial systems resort more often 
with the gradual erosion of their traditional legitimation 
mechanisms,85 focuses mainly on the role of the judge—how she 
conducts the proceedings and reasons her decisions.  Court 
administration tends to be perceived as a support system for the core 
judicial function, and as such, it is not measured by the moral 
standards that the judge and her decision-making process must meet. 
It may be, therefore, that our belief in the rationality of judicial 
discretion, in the firmness of the procedures aimed to ensure it, and 
in a sufficient level of professional fitness of our judges all affect our 
willingness to give up rationality—that is, reason-based decision-
making—at the case allocation stage.  The distance separating the 
initial random process of case allocation and panel assignment from 
the eventual moment of “substantive” judicial decision-making seems 
to be great enough—and, moreover, interrupted by the force of 
rational adjudication—to blur the impact of the former on the latter.  
Judicial discretion appears so exceptional in its reasoned rationality 
that randomness seems its antithesis.  Administrative discretion, in 
contrast, raises suspicion.  It is seen as potentially tainted by the biases 
of bureaucratic culture, skewed incentive regimes, the agency of 
interest groups, and the pressures of the political ranks.86  So 
 
 84  Samaha discusses a close but distinct feature of this odd reality, which he calls 
“the case assignment puzzle”: why do courts condone randomization in various 
governmental decisionmaking contexts (including court management), but exclude 
merits adjudication?  Samaha, supra note 12, at 47.  The paradox I discuss here 
concerns the fact that randomizing case assignment in fact randomizes much of the 
merits results as well. 
 85  See generally Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support 
for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635 (1992); Sara C. Benesh, Understanding Public 
Confidence in American Courts, 68 J. POL. 697 (2006).  See also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 
157 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[I]n this highly politicized matter, the appearance 
of a split decision runs the risk of undermining the public’s confidence in the Court 
itself.”). 
 86  See, e.g., Kenneth F. Warren, Administrative Discretion, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 35, 38 (Jack Rabin ed., 2003) 
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incorporating random elements in administrative decision-making 
processes may actually free the allocating agent from the corrupting 
potential of her job.  The lottery is enabled at the administrative stage 
of adjudication thanks to—and in order to uphold—the ideal of the 
rationality of judicial discretion,87 which, in turn, quells the demand for 
consequential equality in similar cases. 
Therefore, the paradox remains unresolved.  But it does 
nonetheless reveal an important piece of information: we seem to be 
willing to conduct ourselves as a fairly stable political community—or 
are at least capable of doing so—even under conditions of 
institutionalized uncertainty and structural heterogeneity in 
adjudication results.  It is true that the system sometimes employs 
mechanisms intended to limit the variance of judicial outcomes on 
certain issues.  Appeals are meant to serve this purpose (among 
others); sentencing guidelines are another familiar example; as is 
institutional reform of court specialization.  But despite such 
mechanisms, adjudication remains mostly diffuse.  Most cases are 
handled by generalist judges (or juries) and are not subject to effective 
appellate review. 
The next Part builds on this insight about the equilibrium 
reached by the judicial system in merging diffuse and random 
elements at the institutional level with rational discretion elements at 
the consequential level.  On this basis, it suggests the usefulness of the 
random allocation mechanism for the network of jurisdictions 
comprising the court system as a whole. 
IV. THE CASE FOR RANDOM ALLOCATION 
A. The Random Allocation Model: Description and Justifications 
As discussed in Part I, in conditions of jurisdictional overlap, the 
choice of forum is effectively in the hands of the initiator of the 
litigation.  Although this may lead to optimal use of the information 
she holds, and although it may enhance her sense of autonomy and 
 
(“Discretionary decision are . . . clouded by administrators past experiences, present 
environmental demands, politics, and personal values.”). 
 87  See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 11 (1921) 
(“Some principle, however unavowed and inarticulate and subconscious, has regulated 
the infusion . . . .  [A] choice there has been, not a submission to the decree of 
Fate . . . .”); TAMANAHA, supra note 55, at 123 (describing the rule of law ideal: “as the 
judge becomes indoctrinated in the ways of the law and the judicial role, the judge 
becomes the law personified.  In the ideal, the judge is to be unbiased, free of passion, 
prejudice, and arbitrariness, loyal to the law alone”); PIERRE SCHLAG, THE 
ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 19–29 (1998). 
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agency, her strategic advantage could lead to socially undesirable, 
sometimes even harmful, results.  This risk could be moderated by an 
ad hoc lottery to determine the forum.  Under the Random Allocation 
Model, cases would be filed with an administrative unit within the court 
system, which would then randomly assign them to one of the forums 
with jurisdiction over the case.  The allocation mechanism could apply 
equal randomness, which would assure an equal chance of the case 
reaching any of the relevant forums; or it could be based on a biased 
lottery, assigning different probabilities of reaching different forums.  
As will be demonstrated below, the choice of lottery type will derive 
from the substantive purposes of the allocation process.  The 
important thing to understand, though, is that this kind of purposive 
analysis is applicable only absent the premise of the initiator’s control 
over choice of forum. 
A random allocation mechanism would incorporate the following 
typical advantages of procedural randomness into the choice of forum 
process: it would enhance social utility, because the process would 
become shorter and simpler and would also save the wasteful 
investment in strategic planning; and it would ensure fairness ex-ante 
among the parties, because they would have equal chances of receiving 
each of the alternatives.  Access to a beneficial forum can be thought 
of as an indivisible resource; it therefore makes sense to allocate it by 
lottery, as the system is supposed to be neutral among the parties in 
the initial stage of the litigation.88  Beyond these familiar justifications, 
however, there are also other social interests that might benefit from 
the adoption of randomness: it will guarantee greater equality among 
parties (distributive purpose); sustain over time a multiplicity of 
normative visions in the institutional field (pluralist purpose); and add 
information in the process of improving adjudication (epistemic 
purpose).  I will now reflect on each of these three justifications in 
detail.  I will then address several important challenges and counter-
arguments to the ideas set out below. 
1. Distributive Justice 
As previously discussed, creating an opportunity for the initiator 
to behave strategically at the choice of forum stage gives sophisticated 
parties an advantage.  Such parties have the resources and, hence, the 
capacity to assess with relative accuracy their chances to succeed in 
each of the relevant forums (for example, if they are repeat players 
 
 88  Samaha thinks in similar terms of “the tragically scarce and indivisible resource 
of judicial excellence,” which justifies random assignment of cases among judges.  
Samaha, supra note 12, at 66.  
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who are familiar with the system or if they can consult with a seasoned 
lawyer).  Using their superior information, sophisticated initiators can 
locate the forum that they expect will yield the best possible results in 
their litigation.  Although a system with concurrent jurisdiction can be 
assumed to be indifferent regarding which forum is chosen, the parties 
themselves are clearly not.  Thus, there is no reason for one party to 
be given a distributive advantage over another at this initial stage. 
In addition, sophisticated parties can typically better prepare for 
the possibility of litigation and accordingly, act faster upon dispute and 
bring it to the forum of their choice before the other party manages to 
act.  The greater the distributive gap between the parties, the lower the 
chances of counteraction by the adversary (such as raising a forum non 
conveniens claim, employing the right of removal, or seeking change 
of venue) once the process has been put into motion.  Moreover, 
repeat players—usually, large corporations and governmental 
entities—can exploit their initial ability to choose the forum to 
aggregate achievements over multiple litigations (for example by 
strategically directing cases of special importance to one forum or 
another so as to establish (or avoid) a precedent or by maintaining 
long-term relationships with agents in specific courts). 
There are two central types of cases where the potential for 
strategic manipulation of choice of forum can raise distributive 
concerns.  The first category of cases:  disputes in which the party that 
chooses the forum typically possesses greater strategic resources than 
her adversary.  The criminal process is the most obvious context of this 
category of cases.  Other examples would be civil processes of debt 
collection by a bank, a national retailer or service-provider, or an 
administrative entity.  A large, well-funded class action against a 
relatively small defendant would also be included in this category.  In 
such proceedings, the choice of forum can affect their nature and 
outcome, in a single case or over a series of cases.  The second category 
of cases: the nature of the dispute or available forum makes strategic 
manipulation distributively concerning.  An example would be family 
disputes, which often implicate gendered or other social biases and 
distinctions and might, therefore, raise the distributive concern that 
strategic choice of forum will reproduce existing power structures 
rather than challenge them.  Consider for example disputes over child 
custody or rearing, in which society has a professed interest in being 
part of, and introducing public values into, the privately-run litigation. 
 
 
 
ARONSON (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2015  5:12 PM 
2015] FORUM BY COIN FLIP 93 
Cases falling into these two categories—i.e., when there are 
significant regressive ramifications to a party’s strategic power—
require a procedural alternative that will remove her choice of forum 
advantage.  In eliminating the initiator’s ability to secure a familiar 
court setting and thereby impeding her ability to prepare in advance 
for the litigation, this will put parties on more equal footing at the start 
of the proceedings, at least with regard to the litigation forum.89  A 
random allocation rule—instituting an ad hoc equal lottery—would 
support this end.  It would save the costs of strategic preparation, 
allowing the parties to prepare, at best, for the given probabilities of 
reaching each of the possible forums (assuming these probabilities are 
publicly known).  At the same time, such a rule would also eliminate 
the capacity of the system itself—that is, of its allocating agents—to 
prefer one forum over others and thereby bias case outcomes.  A 
random allocation rule is, accordingly, equal ex-ante both among the 
parties to a given case and among parties across different proceedings 
because each case has the same probabilities-matrix of reaching each 
of the jurisdictionally relevant forums.  The rule is neutral in the sense 
that it does not allow for the preference of one forum over others. 
Because the distributive justification applies the random 
allocation rule to only certain categories of cases (and not others, for 
example where the capacity to choose a forum a remove a case actually 
empowers weakened parties), we run into the classification problem: 
how to determine—and more importantly, who will determine—that 
a certain case belongs to one of the categories of cases in which a 
distributive concern tends to arise and, therefore, should be randomly 
assigned.  In some contexts, the classification is fairly simple, since they 
exhibit clearly-identifiable instances of distributive concern, such as 
criminal prosecutions or tax or immigration proceedings; these could 
be set out en masse in procedural legislation.  In less obvious cases, 
refined categorization tools are necessary to identify instances that fall 
in the categories of cases warranting random allocation for distributive 
reasons.  These could be based on types of parties or the subject-matter 
of the dispute, as previous work on this topic has proposed.90 
 
 
 
 89  See also Yuval Feldman & Shahar Lifshitz, Behind the Veil of Legal Uncertainty, 74 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133 (2011) (suggesting enhancing uncertainty with regard to 
the legal consequences of certain practices in order to eliminate the operation of 
undue reasons). 
 90  See, e.g., Issachar Rosen Zvi & Talia Fisher, Overcoming Procedural Boundaries, 94 
VA. L. REV. 79 (2008) (suggesting a novel typology of legal cases according to wealth 
and power disparities among parties). 
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As noted, the distributive justification for random allocation in 
cases of concurrent jurisdiction assumes the system’s moral 
indifference to the competing forums.  This is not a necessary premise.  
Various ideological viewpoints might prefer that certain kinds of cases 
reach certain kinds of forums, even though the rules of concurrent 
jurisdiction allow equal access to multiple forums.  Thus, for example, 
in the U.S., civil rights activists have long preferred federal courts over 
state courts in litigating constitutional claims, while a federalism-
centered point of view might support a greater role for state courts in 
interpreting the Constitution.  The Random Allocation Model, which 
assumes equal chances to reach either forum, reflects, in contrast, 
respect for the given fact of institutional multiplicity in the judicial 
system.91  Whether this diversity is a planned reality or the result of 
unintended processes,92 the random model promotes a synchronic 
understanding of the judicial system.  It takes account of existing 
institutional conditions and gives them their utmost effect.  If the legal 
system has generated multiple, concurrent forums to determine 
certain kinds of cases, then it should arguably embrace an allocation 
mechanism that will effectuate this choice, without allowing an undue 
advantage to quick or sophisticated parties.  Still, in the discussion of 
pluralism below, I will seek to show that there are also independent 
reasons, beyond the effectuation of an existing state of jurisdictional 
affairs, for an arbitrary equalization of access to overlapping 
jurisdictions. 
At the same time, random allocation could also be used to attain 
a sort of distributive “affirmative action.”  This could be done through 
a lottery that is biased in favor of a certain forum or through more 
complex methods of randomization.  Thus, for example, assume we 
prefer that most prosecutions of terrorism suspects are brought before 
military tribunals, but also want to keep civilian courts in the picture, 
perhaps in order to monitor interrogation practices by sample.  We 
could create a lottery in which 80 percent (for the sake of the example) 
of the relevant cases are brought before military commissions and 20 
percent are referred to federal district courts.  Under such a scheme, 
all cases have the same probability distributions of reaching each 
forum, so that in that respect, ex-ante equality among all defendants is 
maintained.  At the same time, the power of the prosecuting 
authorities to strategically choose their forum of preference for each 
and every case is eliminated.  Consider another example, in the 
 
 91  See supra Part III.B (on plurality as the outcome of randomization). 
 92  See BAUM, supra note 15, at 5 (characterizing the process leading to the reality 
of court specialization as mostly “inadvertence rather than design”). 
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context of family disputes subject to concurrent jurisdiction: to the 
extent a legal bias exists favoring men over women in heterosexual 
property distribution decisions,93 we may want to grant women an 
initial advantage in choice of forum.  This can be done by subjecting 
only men to an allocating lottery.  Under such a system, women are still 
rewarded for acting quickly, whereas men lose the incentive to do so, 
but without granting complete veto power to women.  Of course, these 
suggestions raise complex problems and issues, some of which are 
taken up below.  It is important to note, however, that we can begin 
debating them only once we abandon the assumption of initial choice 
by the litigation initiator and consider, instead, mechanisms that are 
not dependent on pure party agency. 
2. Pluralism 
By eliminating the strategic element in choice of forum and 
replacing it with random allocation, we would be relinquishing a 
market system of forum competition.  The latter system often implies 
processes of specialization and “natural selection,” which leads to the 
eventual precedence of certain forums over others.94  A lottery at the 
choice of forum stage would prevent parties from directing their cases 
to the most efficient or competent forum in a given case.  The 
ramification would be a certain added cost in terms of the social utility 
of the judicial system.  Some cases would necessarily arrive at a sub-
optimal forum, while some forums that should have (according to 
some evaluation criterion) diminished and withered over time are 
likely to remain in operation and continue to get cases. 
Still, this result can at the same time benefit the promotion of the 
political ideal of value pluralism in adjudication.  In ideologically, 
culturally, religiously, and ethnically diverse political communities—
all contemporary democracies, in effect—mainstream liberal theory 
currently demands equal concern and respect for all competing value 
systems, or at least the reasonable ones.95  This pluralistic approach 
requires, at a minimum, making room for competing cultural visions 
 
 93  See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical Analysis 
of Discretionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401, 512–13 (1996) (reporting findings 
from an empirical study of New York divorce cases in which “[j]udicial decisions often 
reflected traditional gender stereotypes,” if not outright bias).  
 94  See supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text. 
 95  See, e.g., ISAIAH BERLIN, The Pursuit of the Ideal, in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF 
HUMANITY 1–19 (1998); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 302–14 (1998); 
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 231–40 (2005); AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 
239–47 (2009); Martha Minow & Joseph William Singer, In Favor of Foxes: Pluralism as 
Fact and Aid to the Pursuit of Justice, 90 B.U. L. REV. 903 (2010). 
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in the public sphere, in resource allocation, and in public processes of 
decision-making.  Under more ambitious versions of this view, a 
pluralistic community should also institutionalize modes of 
communication, discourse, and education among the groups 
comprising it, with the purpose of enriching the community’s 
aggregate cultural resources and creating conditions for available exit 
from and entry into different groups. 
A diffuse judicial system can support these pluralist ideals.  
Because courts are central social institutions in the development and 
dissemination of public values,96 institutional heterogeneity in their 
design can express the cultural and geographic diversity of the political 
community (a symbolic/educational function); give effective 
normative presence to the conceptions and demands of different 
groups (a legal-pluralist function); and facilitate an ongoing exchange 
among the various groups through judicial discourse on shared 
normative issues, like the interpretation of constitutional or 
procedural norms (a deliberative-learning function).  Since the 
institutional idiosyncrasies of each kind of court produce distinct 
forms of legal experience, and given that very few of the decisions of 
these forums are subject to homogenizing appellate review, a 
multiplicity of court forums sustains a diverse character to the legal 
order.  As such, the court system constitutes a field of state power that 
recognizes, expresses, and facilitates the value-pluralist character of 
the political community.97  Of course, this is a limited sort of diversity, 
since the various forums apply a shared system of rules (or at least a 
shared constitutional regime), albeit through diverse institutional 
vehicles.  This ensures that pluralism does not turn into complete 
normative balkanization, and a shared framework of power and 
discourse—a legal culture, grounded in an overall constitutional 
structure98—is maintained. 
The random allocation of cases to diverse forums with concurrent 
jurisdiction will assist in upholding the consequential pluralism of the 
legal system, even if individual litigants have no interest in such 
pluralism.  Implementing an equal lottery in a competition between 
two forums ensures that 50 percent of all relevant cases will reach each 
of the forums, and so the political community will enjoy the 
 
 96  See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); OWEN 
FISS, The Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication, in THE LAW AS IT COULD BE 48 
(2003). 
 97  See Aronson, supra note 13, at 266–67. 
 98  See Menachem Mautner, Three Approaches to Law and Culture, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 
839, 856–67 (2011) (surveying theories of judicial behavior and discourse as a “distinct 
cultural system”). 
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comparable input of each of the institutional alternatives (state A and 
state B, state and federal, military and civilian, religious and secular).  
Such a mechanism sacrifices the individual autonomy of the 
proceeding’s initiator, as well as that of a separatist community or a 
monopolistic forum-competitor, for the benefit of a consequential 
institutional ideal of normative diversity and of continuous interaction 
among members of different knowledge and culture groups. 
Significantly, this kind of pluralism does not reflect the 
communitarian stream in multicultural thought, which calls for the 
state to use its power to enable groups to maintain separate and 
exclusive normative frameworks.  Rather, this is a model that seeks 
ongoing interaction (through legal-normative discourse) among 
groups and group members and, therefore, demands that groups relax 
their exit and entry barriers, at least as long as they make use of state-
sanctioned judicial power.99  Such “social engineering” is not a rare 
feat.  Incorporation of arbitrary elements into a rule—or, at any rate, 
elements that do not take into full account the preferences of those 
subject to the rule—is a familiar (if constitutionally contested) strategy 
for promoting social and class diversity in various policy contexts, such 
as university admission100 or soldier placement in military units.101 
Of course, a necessary condition for the legitimacy of pluralism-
based random allocation is that all of the relevant forums meet 
minimum standards of procedural fairness.  It is justified to force 
parties to litigate in a forum they have not chosen (given a preferred 
alternative) only if each of the alternatives is morally tolerable.  The 
degree of tolerability derives from the prevailing legal-procedural ideal 
in a given society at a given time and so cannot be set out in general 
terms.  It does make sense, however, that a reasonably liberal 
community would require all available forums to adhere to basic due 
process tenets and treat all litigants in an equal and respectful manner, 
even if a particular litigant does not share the normative commitments 
or cultural biases that characterize the forum to which she was sent.  
Ostensibly, this should not be too much of a challenge, as all 
institutional alternatives are the products of the democratic system to 
begin with.  Even within democracies, however, not all forums 
maintain similar levels of procedural fairness.  Military forums raise 
 
 99  See, e.g., Leslie Green, Rights of Exit, 4 LEG. THEORY 165 (1998). 
 100  See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (allowing the inclusion of 
some considerations of racial diversity in law school admission policies, although a 
lottery was deemed too arbitrary). 
 101  See MORRIS J. MACGREGOR, JR., INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES 1940–1965 ch. 
7 (1985) (the U.S. military resorted to quotas in order to ensure inclusion of black 
soldiers in “white’” units). 
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constant concerns, as do religious courts where such exist, but so might 
seemingly innocuous forums of the problem-solving variety, which are 
often criticized for relaxing due process guarantees in the furtherance 
of other institutional purposes.102  For such forums to be included in 
an essentially coercive system of pluralist allocation, they would have 
to satisfy general conditions of fairness. 
3. Knowledge 
Institutional heterogeneity does not only promote the pluralist 
goal of respecting competing normative worlds.  It can also serve 
another purpose—that of infusing information into political discourse 
and institutional design processes.  There are several aspects to this 
latter objective.  On one level, which is closely related to the pluralist 
argument rationale, we can construe deep cultural disagreements as 
complex questions to which we have yet to find conclusive answers.  
Consider, for example, the profound controversies on gun rights or 
gay marriage, on which state and federal judiciaries, or the courts of 
different regions, might genuinely and reasonably disagree.  While 
resolution to the underlying moral dilemmas is possibly out there, it 
may be that we are simply in need of more time to fully fathom their 
implications or come up with new data or arguments or theories that 
would help in reaching resolution.  If this is the case, then it is justified 
to keep multiple alternatives available, side by side, so that we can 
continue experimenting with them and learning from them and 
perhaps even agree on the dominance of one or the other at some 
point in the future.  A random allocation mechanism would ensure 
that strategic litigants would not undermine this social interest in 
maintaining concurrent alternatives that reflect genuine and as-of-yet 
irresolvable differences among members of the political community. 
On a slightly more practical level, heterogeneous alternatives are 
a familiar and often necessary means in any experimental process 
testing the utility of a novel policy idea.  Institutional moves toward 
specialization in adjudication are often devised with this in mind.  
Decisions to establish new court forums devoted to a unique subject-
matter are a commonplace phenomenon, usually based on the 
predictions of experts and politicians as to the social gains that will 
result.103  A responsible decision-making process, however, should be 
wary of granting such new forums complete and exclusive jurisdiction 
without first testing the assumptions that led to their creation.  One 
 
 102  See, e.g., Phylis Skloot Bamberger, Specialized Courts: Not a Cure-All, 30 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1091 (2003). 
 103  See BAUM, supra note 15, at 49–55. 
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way of conducting such an assessment is to attempt (perhaps during a 
predetermined trial period) concurrent jurisdiction between the new 
forum and old forum and randomly distribute cases to both.  This 
would reveal the relative benefits of each alternative. 
This idea of course draws from the familiar and normal practice 
of scientists from various disciplines, who regularly divide tested 
communities into trial and control groups to conduct informed 
comparisons.104  Just recently, several prominent legal scholars 
proposed that legal designers adopt this model, so that new regulatory 
programs would include an initial stage testing the effectiveness of 
proposed policy relative to an alternative (the status quo or any other 
suggested innovation), with trial and control groups to be selected 
randomly from the relevant population.105  The random element here 
is crucial.  It is intended to limit the capacity of the experimenter to 
skew the composition of the trial and control groups (intentionally or 
unconsciously) and, even more, the possibility of the subjects 
themselves altering the experiment’s results by joining either of the 
groups for exogenous reasons.  The experimenter’s main objective is 
to examine the functioning of the relevant alternatives in similar 
conditions; in our context, this would be the ways in which different 
court forums treat similar cases.  It would require sending similarly-
situated parties, who would normally pick the same forum, to different 
courts.  Randomness is the customary way to carry out such an analysis. 
Granted, a comparative experiment in the operation of 
competing court forums with a random allocation of litigants does not 
qualify as a controlled “lab” experiment.  It is an experiment in actual 
social life, and all the participants are affected by it in real and direct 
terms (there’s no placebo option), without even consenting to 
participate (at least not in the regular sense of informed consent, as 
opposed, perhaps, to the presumed consent of social-contract based 
democratic legitimation theories).  This means that—as with the 
pluralist justification—all of the alternatives must conform to minimal 
conditions of procedural tolerability in order to justify their 
experimental worthiness.  Moreover, the compared alternatives are 
cognizant of one another and thus might behave in a strategic or 
competitive fashion to gain more acceptance, power, and income.  The 
race among forums for corporate chartering—in the U.S., currently 
 
 104  See RONALD A. FISHER, THE DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 17–21 (1971) (introducing 
randomized testing as a method for scientific inquiry). 
 105  See Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres & Yair Listokin, Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. 
L. REV. 929 (2011). 
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being won hands-down by Delaware—exemplifies this.106  These 
dynamics could clearly skew the comparative analysis and should, 
therefore, be accounted for as well. 
Still, assuming minimum assurances of procedural fairness, the 
parallel treatment of similar cases in different forums can teach us a 
lot—both on how these forums behave and on the various ways 
available for treating similar problems.  It is therefore customary to 
relate to diffuse court systems as “laboratories” in which the legal 
system weighs institutional and doctrinal alternatives, compares them, 
and challenges itself to devise possible innovations; this is one of the 
traditional justifications for the federal system in the U.S., in which 
various states experiment in diverse legal arrangements while other 
states learn from their neighbors’ cumulative experience.107 Indeed, 
the multiplicity of circumstances in which the federal system allows for 
concurrence of jurisdiction has been famously explained by Robert 
Cover as an attempt to promote innovation and critical exchange.108 
Relying on the agency of parties in generating such experimental 
dynamics is problematic, however.  Litigants’ incentives do not tend to 
overlap with the social interest in producing knowledge and 
promoting innovation and experimentalism in institutional design.  
Being strategic actors, parties go to the forums of their own preference.  
Over time, a “free market” of court forums may lead strategic litigants 
to prefer a certain forum and abandon another, although from a social 
perspective, the latter may be an important resource of knowledge, 
innovation, and critique (and aside from the related distributive 
concerns).  Indeed, the near-monopoly of Delaware courts over 
corporate litigation in the U.S. has been decried by some for its 
effective elimination of available normative/institutional alternatives 
for U.S. companies.109  Random allocation solves this problem by 
setting egoistic interests aside and giving precedence to the societal 
interest in a diverse output of the judicial system. 
 
 106  See, e.g., Jonathan Macey, Delaware: Home of the World’s Most Expensive Raincoat, 33 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1131, 1138 (2005) (noting “Delaware’s dominance” and the state’s 
“significant degree of market power” in the U.S. corporate chartering market). 
 107  The most familiar statement of this kind appeared in Justice Brandeis’s dissent 
in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932): “It is one of the happy 
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, 
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to 
the rest of the country.”  For a recent discussion of this argument and an assessment 
of its critiques, see Friedman, supra note 11. 
 108  Cover, supra note 7, at 672–80. 
 109  See Michael Abramowicz, Speeding up the Crawl to the Top, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 139, 
157–59, 189–90 (2003). 
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B. Counter-Arguments and Replies 
1. Man as Means 
One of the central challenges to the argument presented in this 
Article for randomized case allocation might echo the Kantian 
categorical imperative against treating human beings as a means 
alone.110  The argument goes like this: at the individual level, 
incorporating random elements into the management of the judicial 
system for the purpose of furthering general social interests would 
prevent some litigants from fulfilling their own will, and it might even 
forgo the possibility of attaching the most suitable process to a given 
case; the experience of individual parties thus turns into a means of 
sustaining institutional pluralism, albeit with its accompanying 
distributive, political, and epistemic advantages. 
This may sound like a strong rejoinder, but I do not think the 
Kantian point to be compelling in the current context.  Court systems 
are created and developed through complex political and bureaucratic 
processes, which reflect diverse reasons and purposes; some relate to 
the rights of individual litigants, while others to various public or 
parochial interests.  Respect for the person that comes before the law 
does not necessarily entail establishing some particular forum or a 
forum that is necessarily to the person’s liking.  Rather, it is achieved 
by ensuring that any forum at which she arrives will provide basic 
procedures and an impartial arbiter, so that the proceedings will be 
fair and intelligible.  Given these conditions, design of the judicial 
forums and the mechanisms of choice and allocation among them is 
essentially a social matter of general concern.  We are concerned with 
the design of institutions for the development and inculcation of the 
political community’s public norms, which are also the means for 
controlling the state’s use of its violent power against its citizens.  
Making the use of these institutions susceptible to the strategic choices 
of certain litigants seems, in this light, unfair (vis-à-vis their adversaries) 
and undemocratic (vis-à-vis the general public).  Given sufficient 
fairness standards in all of the alternative forums, it is difficult to object 
to society’s making use of the diffuse system it has generated in order 
to realize its values to the fullest extent.111 
 
 110  See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 47 (Allen 
W. Wood trans., 2002) (1785) (“The human being . . . is not a thing, hence not 
something that can be used merely as a means, but must in all his actions always be 
considered as an end in itself.”). 
 111  In fact, as Dorf and Sabel aptly argued, “we do not face a choice between 
experimentation or no experimentation.  The status quo is an ongoing, albeit 
haphazard, experiment.  Between that kind of experiment and a more democratically 
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In addition, recall that the notions of respect, autonomy, and 
agency cited in the current critique of the random model in fact apply 
only to one of the parties in typical court proceedings—the party that 
gets to choose the forum.  As it is, the other party is dragged into the 
process and, as such, becomes a “means” for furthering the interests of 
the former, without having a say in the initial choice of forum.  This is 
the result of a specific structure of the legal process that is neither 
necessary nor easily justified.  It is a state of affairs that, in some 
circumstances, empowers sophisticated parties while denying society 
valuable sources of normative input that a re-imagined diffuse court 
system might yet produce. 
2. Efficiency 
The Random Allocation Model could be criticized on efficiency 
grounds for three related reasons: (1) it fails to utilize the information 
held by the parties regarding the suitable forum; (2) it introduces a 
new element of uncertainty into the litigation matrix, which can mean 
new insurance costs for risk-averse parties (this is also a matter of 
distributive concern, since risk aversion increases for low-income 
individuals112); and (3) in some contexts, it undermines the expertise 
and specialization rationales that led to the creation of separate forums 
in the first place.  Therefore, in certain circumstances, the random 
allocation mechanism will entail litigating a case at a higher cost than 
otherwise necessary.  The random model does away with rational input 
in the market for forums, and it does not replace it with the rational 
input of any other agent.  It simply lets fate decide, and there is no 
reason to assume that luck has a tendency towards efficiency.  The 
control of the central planner is limited to the establishment of the 
various court units (creating the field of alternatives), and the role of 
the proceedings’ initiator is exhausted with the decision to bring her 
case to court (entering the field).  The allocation itself is taken away 
from both of these agents, and in this respect, we could argue that the 
Random Allocation Model is less efficient than reason-based 
alternatives. 
 
 
 
and systematically organized one, we think the choice is easy.”  Michael C. Dorf & 
Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 469 
(1998).  See also Abramowicz et al., supra note 105, at 964–65. 
 112  See William B. Riley Jr. & K. Victor Chow, Asset Allocation and Individual Risk 
Aversion, 48 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 32 (1992); Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, Risk Aversion 
and Incentive Effects, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1644, 1651 (2002) (“[I]ncome has a mildly 
negative effect on risk aversion.”). 
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A partial response to this point turns on the fact that random 
mechanisms are typically very cheap in and of themselves.  This is an 
important point to keep in mind, given the considerable costs invested 
in litigating initial disputes over jurisdiction, venue, and forum 
conveniens.  At least some of these disputes and their accompanying 
costs will be saved by a default random mechanism for resolving 
questions of concurrent jurisdiction.113  A random allocation 
mechanism also will reduce the ex-ante incentive of strategic actors to 
invest resources to prepare for future litigation—an investment that is, 
as discussed, pure waste from a social point of view. 
But a more comprehensive reply to the efficiency critique 
requires a shift from assessing the efficiency of a single instance of 
litigation to considering the aggregate social outcomes over time.  
Even forgoing the distributive justification for the random model 
(assuming, though we shouldn’t, that equality does not promote 
efficiency), the pluralist and epistemic aspects of the model suffice as 
evidence of its concern with improving the quality of law and 
adjudication over time.  Specialization is an important utilitarian 
principle for institutional designers, but over-specialization, which 
dissects legal knowledge into separate and enclosed forums, can also 
lead to a detachment from generalist legal discourse and to the 
vulnerability of such forums to the biases of interest groups and self-
sustaining informational cascades.  The very demand for efficiency 
may, therefore, justify relaxing the rigid boundaries of specialization, 
to some extent, so as to maintain contact and cross-pollination among 
the system’s various units.114 
Indeed, no experiment is short-term “efficient,” since it inevitably 
wastes resources on examining alternatives that are due to be proven 
inferior and eventually abandoned.  But we keep on conducting 
experiments, and we try to converse across institutional and cultural 
borders, because accumulation of knowledge is a project of obvious 
utilitarian benefit from a social perspective.  In this regard, the ideal 
of pluralism not only derives from deontological conceptions of 
dignity and equality, but also emerges as a means for maximizing social 
welfare over time. 
 
 113  The knowledge that the case will be allocated by lottery can also incentivize 
parties to settle before the forum is decided; eliminating the strategic element reduces 
the incentive to withhold information and, thereby, making settlement more 
attainable.  See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement 
to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995). 
 114  See Aronson, supra note 13, at 287–96. 
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3. Legitimacy 
How would a lottery affect the experience of the litigant in the 
judicial process?  The behavioral literature on procedural justice has 
shown that people ascribe considerable importance to the nature of 
the process that led to a decision on their matter, regardless of the 
contents of that decision.  This means that a fair process can reinforce 
the legitimacy of its outcome, even if its subject landed on the losing 
side.  Familiar versions of the procedural justice claim are 
characterized by the expectation that the subject of the decision be 
able to affect its making to present evidence and arguments and 
witness the process by which the evidence and arguments lead to the 
eventual outcome.115  This conception of fairness requires a rational 
decision-making process, and flipping a coin is perceived as its very 
antithesis.116 
This potential argument against the involvement of procedural 
randomness in the process leading to a judicial decision certainly has 
some merit.  Yet it is important to remember that the decision to resort 
to such a mechanism in the first place is reasoned and rational, as well 
as justified by the understanding that it is superior to other allocative 
options.117  Indeed, it is not easy to say what is preferable from a 
procedural justice point of view.  A decider unable to choose among 
given alternatives who disguises a random choice with rational 
arguments that fail to persuade her, or a decider who exposes the dead 
end she has reached and openly resorts to a process that, albeit 
arbitrary, at least ensures equality, like a lottery.118  Nonetheless, given 
the obvious modernist preference for rationality and consistency in 
decision-making,119 it would be reasonable to assume that a random 
allocation mechanism would yield some cost in terms of legitimacy and 
public confidence in the courts.  The knowledge that a decision was 
reached in conditions of ex-ante equality is not always sufficient to 
soften the sense of injustice that results from a consequential defeat.120 
 
 115  See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL 
JUSTICE 93–118 (1988). 
 116  For a detailed description of the argument in the context of lotteries, see 
DUXBURY, supra note 59, at 132–35.  See also ELSTER, supra note 44, at 118–20. 
 117  See ELSTER, supra note 44, at 116.  Cf. Perez, supra note 42, at 141–42. 
 118  See DUXBURY, supra note 59, at 120–21, 132–33. 
 119  See ELSTER, supra note 44, at 116; John E. Coons, Consistency, 79 CAL. L. REV. 59 
(1987). 
 120  See, e.g., ELSTER, supra note 44, at 170 (“Equality ex post has a much more robust 
appeal than equality ex-ante.  Once the coin is tossed, the winner takes all and the 
loser’s knowledge that he or she had an equal chance of being the winner is meager 
consolation.”).  
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A partial response to this concern is tied to the distinction 
suggested earlier in the Article, between substantive judicial decisions 
and administrative decisions made in the pre-trial case allocation 
process.121  As demonstrated, the reality is that most litigants are already 
subject to a random allocation process when it comes to the judge 
assigned to their cases or the pool from which their jury is selected.  
And as discussed earlier, we may be willing to tolerate this treatment 
because we assume that all judges satisfy some minimal standard of 
rational professionalism, so we do not expect to face unbearable 
injustice, whoever the judge may be.  This notion is in fact similar to 
the condition stated above for the legitimacy of forced pluralism in 
court forums—that all available forums satisfy basic tenets of 
procedural tolerability, such that even by arbitrary allocation, we will 
achieve a reasonably fair court. 
In addition, as stressed throughout the discussion, the existing 
arrangement for choice of forum from among concurrent jurisdictions 
does not rest on a fair decision-making process either.  Rather, it is 
based on the strategic agency of the forum chooser, who, surely, pays 
no heed to the preferences of her adversaries.  Adopting a random 
allocation mechanism in place of the prevailing principle of initiator’s 
agency would raise procedural justice concerns for those who have 
become accustomed to making the initial choice of forum; it would 
offer a new element of fairness to the other side. 
4. Opt Out 
It could be argued that sophisticated litigants, knowing they face 
a barrier to strategic preparation due to randomization, will act in 
advance to counteract the uncertainty.  They could do this, in 
principle, in one of two ways: (1) either by resorting to mechanisms of 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR), where the parties have greater 
control over the character of the forum and nature of the proceedings; 
or (2) by contractually ensuring choice of forum or rules of 
procedure.122  Although these possibilities are already available and 
might not breed unique concerns, they do seem to undermine the 
fundamental purposes of the random model.  They diminish the 
 
 121  See supra Part III.C. 
 122  See Jaime Dodge, The Limits Of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723, 
731–54, 783–90 (2011) (surveying the doctrinal landscape regarding procedural 
private ordering, and suggesting a “symmetrical theory” of enforcement which relies 
on the rules governing procedural agreements during trial); Kevin E. Davis & Helen 
Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507, 516–25, 533–55 (2011) 
(describing the practice and evaluating the social spillovers that result from the 
“outsourcing” of procedural norms). 
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redistributive qualities of randomness, because strong parties could 
use superior bargaining power to avoid it; and they erode the 
redeeming potential of jurisdictional multiplicity, because parties 
might abandon the court system for more certain alternatives and 
thereby fail to provide it with the cases it needs to reap the benefits of 
diffusion. 
This is a serious challenge to randomness in some respects, but its 
limits should be noted.  First, with regard to the possibility of opting 
out of the judicial system in favor of alternative forums, this option is 
not available in matters in which the law requires judicial involvement 
and does not allow for non-state alternatives.  The criminal process is 
an obvious example, but so are child custody determinations.  Second, 
as to the possibility of contracting around the random allocation 
process, this can be controlled by fairly straightforward contract law 
doctrines, such as unconscionability, and made subject to judicial 
review. 
Naturally, the risk of contracting around the random process also 
touches on parties’ interest to negotiate the choice of forum question 
ex-post facto—that is, to make a deal after the lottery has already 
handed one of the parties, in random fashion, access to an 
advantageous forum.  Given an equal lottery, the ability to contract ex-
post would sometimes benefit an already-better-off party (although at 
other times, it would give a weaker party an additional bargaining 
chip), as well as undermine the systemic interest in preserving a 
plurality of active forums.  The random model therefore requires a 
“protection mechanism.”  Such a mechanism could determine that the 
result of the lottery is final and unchangeable, although this would not 
contend with the option of withdrawing the case altogether from the 
judicial system.  Accordingly, a means of regulating contractual 
evasions would be needed here too. 
CONCLUSION 
The idea of incorporating random decision rules into the legal 
process is not a panacea, and it certainly has its costs.  But it also hints 
at new directions for solving the puzzle of procedural law—how to 
create a normative field that meets the moral requirements of 
procedural justice and promotes the values embedded in litigation, 
without distorting people’s pre-litigation preferences and choices.  
Randomization can diminish harmful incentives and distributive 
disparities ex-ante.  At the same time, it can facilitate the realization of 
the pluralist potential of a diffuse court system as well as the treasure-
trove of knowledge it generates. 
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On our way to these goals, we must consider the procedural norm 
in its systemic, not individualized, context.  A systemic perspective 
relates to the aggregate product of the judicial system over time and 
across cases and courts and not the personal achievement of one or 
another party.  The procedural norm is, of course, subject to 
foundational conditions of fairness, because all litigants are persons 
worthy of respectful treatment.  But being exempt from the need to 
instruct behavior beyond the courthouse, this norm may also be 
released from the requirement of rigid consistency in the management 
of adjudication, if other purposes may be better served otherwise.  
Randomness offers an inconsistency that is not corrupt; it is a resource 
worth utilizing. 
 
